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AN ABSENCE OF FAIRNESS…  
RESTRICTIONS ON INDUSTRIAL ACTION AND PROTEST IN THE TRADE 
UNION BILL 2015 
 
Michael Ford QC and Tonia Novitz* 
 
 
Mr Barry Sheerman (Huddersfield) (Lab/Co-op): If this is such a fair and reasonable Bill, why 
does the right hon. Gentleman’s predecessor, Vince Cable, say that it is both “vindictive” and 
“unnecessary”? 
Sajid Javid: There is a new Business Secretary in this Government and he is the one presenting 
this Bill. 
 
14 September 2015, House of Commons Hansard, col. 761 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In July 2015, a Trade Union Bill was introduced by the incoming Conservative 
Government which seeks to place significant restrictions on UK trade union activity, 
probably in anticipation of deep budgetary cuts affecting the public sector which are 
likely to generate protest. The assertion has been made that this legislative proposal 
is fair and balanced. We contest that claim with reference to the likely effect of the 
measures on industrial action, pickets and protests. The consultative process was 
incomplete and the substantive provisions unfairly target union-organised strikes 
                                                          
* Professors, University of Bristol Law School. We are grateful to Shae McCrystal and other 
participants in the ‘Comparative Strike Ballots workshop’ hosted by the Labour Law and Relations 
Group at Sydney Law School in August 2015; to members of the Institute of Employment Rights who 
have also commented on the Bill; to Richard Arthur (at Thompsons) for information and advice; and 
European colleagues who are assisting us in a comparative European project on aspects of the 
legislation. All errors and omissions are our own.   
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and protests. The proposals are open to challenge on grounds of insufficient 
justification, impracticability of compliance and violation of fundamental civil 
liberties. They entail probable breach of UK obligations in respect of International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) standards and rights arising under the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and European Social Charter (ESC). By 
further restricting the scope of lawful industrial action and pickets, the proposed 
legislation risks provoking other kinds of protest.   
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
  
In 1998, one year after their election, an incoming Labour Government offered their 
vision of industrial relations in a White Paper: Fairness at Work.1 Their vision ran only 
to 47 pages, but offered a unified picture of ‘partnership’ in the workplace carefully 
managed through extensive consultation with the social partners, particularly as 
regards settlement on a trade union recognition procedure.2 The principles were 
endorsed by some as emblematic of a new mode of regulation of work,3 while others 
pointed to their potential problematic effects.4 In 2015, as a (non-coalition) 
Conservative Government comes to power for the first time since 1997, major 
industrial reform is again proposed. Now the impression is less one of planning, 
consultation and principle, but of opportunism. The concerns are those of a 
Government determined to execute £12 billion in spending cuts, largely from a 
                                                          
1 Cm3968 (London: TSO, 1998). 
2 See Lord Wedderburn, ‘Collective Bargaining or Legal Enactment: The 1999 Act and Union 
Recognition’ (2000) 29 Industrial Law Journal (ILJ) 1 at 2; and B. Simpson, ‘Trade Union Recognition 
and the Law – A New Approach’ (2000) 29(3) ILJ 193. 
3 H. Collins, ‘Regulating the Employment Relation for Competitiveness’ (2001) 30(1) ILJ 17. 
4 Cf. P. Smith and G. Morton, ‘Nine Years of New Labour: Neoliberalism and Workers’ Rights’ (2006) 
44(3) British Journal of Industrial Relations 401; A.Bogg, 'New Labour, Trade Unions, and the Liberal 
State' (2009) 20 King's Law Journal 403; and T. Novitz and P. Skidmore, Fairness at Work: A Critical 
Analysis of the Employment Relations Act 1999 and its Treatment of Collective Rights (Oxford: Hart, 2001). 
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public sector where trade unions are most active.5 In the Transparency of Lobbying, 
Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act 2014 the Coalition 
Government had sought to place constraints on trade union political activity and 
management of membership records in ways that could affect industrial action 
ballots. Now the Trade Union Bill 2015 (‘the Bill’), the accompanying secondary 
legislation, and linked proposals in the consultation set out a host of provisions 
designed radically to diminish the right to strike, to place unique restrictions on 
protests organised by trade unions, and generally to reduce trade union influence. 
 
The measures in the Bill include changes to the balloting requirements and notice 
provisions in Part V of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 
1992 (TULRCA);6 further restrictions on peaceful picketing;7 new rules on the 
political activity of trade unions, traditionally channelled through the Labour Party, 
requiring members to ‘opt in’ to a political fund;8 restrictions on trade unions’ 
facility time in the public sector (with check off also in the Government’s sights);9 
and greater controls on trade unions by an increasingly politicised Certification 
Officer (CO) with new powers.10 At the same time, the Government has published 
draft regulations to allow employers to hire agency workers to replace striking 
                                                          
5 Trade union membership in the private sector sits today at approximately 14% and in the public 
sector lies around 54%. See Department for Business Innovation and Skills (BIS), Trade Union 
Membership 2014: Statistical Bulletin (June 2015), at 5-6. For planned spending cuts, see discussion at 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/06/20/uk-britain-economy-cuts-idUKKBN0P00VH20150620.   
6 Bill 2015, clauses 2 – 8. 
7 Ibid., clause 9. 
8 Ibid., clauses 11-12. 
9 Ibid., clauses 12-13. Abolition of public sector check-off was not announced in the Bill as initially 
published, but in a press release issued by the Government 6.08.15: See 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-steps-to-tackle-taxpayer-funded-support-to-trade-
unions. 
10 Bill 2015, clauses 14-17. 
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workers,11 and proposes further restrictions on protests organised by trade unions 
not involving traditional industrial action at the workplace but which are not (yet) in 
the Bill.12 
 
Accompanying the publication of the Bill on 15 July 2015 were three different 
Consultation Papers: Ballot Thresholds in Important Public Services, Hiring Agency Staff 
During Strike Action and Tackling Intimidation of Non-Striking Workers.13 The 
Consultation Papers were only partial in coverage. They did not invite comment on 
all measures, giving a sense of inevitability about measures such as changes to ballot 
paper requirements, additional strike notice provisions and limitation on the 
duration of a ballot mandate. The Online Survey forms, with carefully directed 
questions and limited space given in boxes for responses, did not allow much scope 
for expression of broader concerns or criticism of the proposals.14 In some cases the 
Consultation Papers appeared to be trying to gather evidence to support the case for 
legislation, exemplified by Tackling Intimidation of Non-Striking Workers which asked 
consultees to provide evidence of intimidatory behaviour.15 Nor did the 
Consultation Papers offer any holistic vision of the justification for change, instead 
making inconsistent references to a menu of assorted reasons.  
 
Each Consultation Paper was accompanied by an individual Impact Assessment,16 
although these too were incomplete in their coverage.17 The Government also 
                                                          
11 The draft regulations are annexed to the Consultation Paper, Hiring Agency Staff During Strike Action 
BIS/15/416 (2015). 
12 These proposals are in the Consultation Paper, Tackling Intimidation of Non-Striking Workers 
BIS/15/415 (2015), but not in clauses in the Bill. 
13 https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/trade-union-bill. 
14 See the frustration expressed in this respect in Ballot Thresholds in Important Public Services: Unison 
submission – September 2015 (‘Unison submission’) (2015), at 1.Available at: 
https://www.unison.org.uk/search/?tax=post_tag&term=2015-trade-union-bill.  
15 BIS/15/415, at 15. 
16 https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/trade-union-bill. 
17 See the discussion on Picketing and Protest below. 
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presented a brief Trade Union Bill: European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
Memorandum which accepted that some of the measures proposed (although not all 
were considered) will engage a number of key human rights (in particular, Articles 
6, 11, and 14 and Article 1 of Protocol 1), but denying breach in each case on the basis 
that the measures are justified and proportionate.18 The Government relied on a 
wide margin of appreciation being given to the UK under Article 11, but ignored 
Article 10 and much relevant case-law, and failed to deal comprehensively with all 
the potential effects of the Bill. In this respect Liberty has commented that:  
 
Ideological motivations of any Government are part and parcel of politics but 
should not imperil the protection of rights and freedoms of individuals. Yet 
this relatively short Bill has the potential to cause significant damage to fair 
and effective industrial relations in this country and would set a dangerous 
precedent for the wider curtailment of freedom of assembly and association.19  
 
Most notably of all, compliance with ILO or ESC standards is not mentioned once in 
the Memorandum or the Consultation Papers.20 The UK has been a member of the 
ILO since its establishment in 1919 and was the very first State to ratify ILO 
Convention No 87 on Freedom of Association and the Right to Organise (in 1949) 
and Convention No. 98 on the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining (in 1950). 
Further, the UK ratified another key instrument adopted in the Council of Europe, 
the ESC of 1961, and agreed to be bound by Article 5 (the right to organise) and 
Article 6 (the right to bargain collectively, including in Article 6(4) the right to strike) 
                                                          
18 See BIS/15/466 (2015), Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/trade-union-
bill-european-convention-on-human-rights-echr. 
19 Liberty’s briefing on the Trade Union Bill for Second Reading in the House of Commons, cited in 
House of Commons Hansard, 14.09.15, col. 828. 
20 The potential breach of UK obligations in this regard was raised by Angela Eagle at the second 
reading debate: see HC Hansard, 14.09.15, col. 779. 
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without reservation.21 The relevant supervisory body, the European Committee of 
Social Rights (ECSR), has recently, through the collective complaints procedure, 
referred to established ILO supervisory jurisprudence22 and reiterated the 
significance of ‘the right of workers and trade unions to engage in collective action 
for the protection of economic and social interests of the workers’. 23 In January 2015 
the ECSR, through its basic reporting procedure, issued recommendations relating to 
UK law on the right to strike, which it considers unsatisfactory as it stands.24 ILO 
Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 (and others), the findings of ILO supervisory bodies and 
the ESC and ECSR decisions are all highly relevant to the application of Article 11 of 
the ECHR.25    
 
Serious concerns have been raised about the lack of evidence in the Consultation 
Papers and Impact Assessments, leading the Regulatory Policy Committee (RPC) to 
declare all three Impact Assessments ‘not fit for purpose’. For example, it said that the 
Impact Assessment on Ballot Thresholds in Important Public Services ‘does not explain 
                                                          
21 For ratification as at 1962 and subsequent declarations under Article 20 and in respect of other 
provisions, see 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeDeclarations.asp?NT=035&CM=1&DF=&CL=EN
G&VL=1. 
22 Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO) and Swedish Confederation of Professional Employees (TCO) v 
Sweden, Complaint No. 85/2012, Decision on admissibility and on the merits, 3.07.13, para. 9. The 
Committee upheld the complaint that legislative reform undertaken in Sweden in response to Case C-
341/05 Laval un Partneri v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet [2007] ECR I-11767 was non-compliant 
with Article 6(4) the European Social Charter. See for discussion T. Novitz, ‘The Internationally 
Recognized Right to Strike: A Past, Present, and Future Basis upon Which to Evaluate Remedies for 
Unlawful Collective Action?’(2014) 30(3) The International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and 
Industrial Relations 357 at 370-1. 
23 Complaint No. 85/2012, para. 120. Not that the UK is not a party to the Revised Social Charter of 
1996 or the Collective Complaints Protocol of 1995, but remains bound by the core obligations 
undertaken in respect of the European Social Charter 1961. 
24 Jan 2015 Conclusions of the European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR) XX-3 (2014) at 21 – 24. 
25 See Demir and Baykara v Turkey Appn 34503/97, 12.11.08 [2009] IRLR 766 at para. 85; also text 
accompanying n.63 below. 
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and present the rationale for the proposals in a straightforward and logical way’,  and 
fails to provide ‘a clear enough basis for consultation’ or sufficient evidence.26 The 
extremely brief, essentially one page, discussion in the Consultation Paper on hiring 
agency staff discusses strikes in public services when the measures extend to all 
sectors.27 The central assumption in the accompanying Impact Assessment, that about 
22% of the days lost to industrial action in the UK could be covered by agency workers, 
was based on insufficient data according to the RPC.28 The Consultation on Tackling 
Intimidation of Non-Striking Workers makes extensive reference to ‘evidence’ presented 
to the Carr Review29 yet only records in a footnote that these were allegations, not 
findings.30 It fails to mention the Carr Review identified ‘the lack of a significant 
enough body of evidence to support any recommendations for change’.31  
 
The Bill is notable for the width of criticism directed at it, not only from trade 
unions, Liberty, the British Institute of Human Rights, and Amnesty International,32 
but also from unexpected quarters.  The CIPD, the professional body for human 
resources and people development, stated that the proposed changes are outdated in 
their ideological orientation, may interfere with what are currently constructive 
                                                          
26 RPC15-BIS-2402, 18.09.15.  
27 See BIS/15/416 (2015), 7. 
28 See BIS/14/420 IA, especially at paras 1, 26-8, 64 and Annex 1 and RPC15-BIS-2403, 1.10.15. 
29 The Carr Report: The Report of the Independent Review of the Law Governing Industrial Disputes (15.10.14) 
available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/carr-review-of-the-law-on-industrial-
disputes.  
30 See BIS/15/415 at 4, footnote 1.  
31 The Carr Report n.29 above, 1. A concerned shared in RPC15-BIS-2404, Tackling Intimidation of Non-
Striking Workers, 18.08.15. 
32 See Joint Statement, available at: https://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/news/press-releases-
and-statements/trade-union-bill-represents-major-attack-civil-liberties-uk. 
8 
 
relations between employers and unions and harden attitudes, producing various 
unintended consequences.33  
 
In this article we consider the key aspects of the proposed reforms designed to 
control or prevent strikes, pickets and other forms of union-organised protest, 
including those on which the public was not invited to submit comments in the 
consultation prior to the Bill’s passage through Parliament. The highly significant 
reforms relating to political funding and the role of the CO have been the subject of 
critical comment elsewhere.34 Since records began in December 1931, the highest 
working days lost in industrial action was 32.2 million for the year preceding April 
1980; the lowest was 143,000 for the 12 months to March 2011.35 On this basis, the 
Government’s estimate of an annual 675,000 working days lost to industrial action36 
seems excessive, but is perhaps in anticipation of further resistance to public sector 
cuts. We seek to identify practical problems with the proposals, and where they may 
breach ECHR, ESC and ILO obligations. But perhaps the strongest indictment of the 
measures is their clear potential to undermine further the relationship between 
workers (and their unions) with employers, with the potential for: 
  
greater disruption and use of leverage campaigns, such as withdrawal of good 
will, work-to-rule, protests, demonstrations and unofficial action. Paradoxically, 
the Bill might result in more working days lost to industrial action ...37 
   
                                                          
33 Available at: 
http://www.cipd.co.uk/pm/peoplemanagement/b/weblog/archive/2015/09/09/trade-union-
reforms-are-outdated-response-warns-cipd.aspx. 
34 See K.D. Ewing and J. Hendy, Kill the Bill (Liverpool: Institute of Employment Rights, 2015) at 12–
15. 
35 http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/lms/labour-market-statistics/april-2015/statistical-
bulletin.html#tab-7--Labour-Disputes--not-seasonally-adjusted-. 
36 Impact Assessment: Hiring Agency Staff During Strike Action: reforming regulation (2015) BIS/15/420 at 
14. 
37 HC Hansard, 14.09.15, col. 801 per Iain Wright (Lab). 
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2. RESTRICTION OF ACCESS TO (AND THE EFFECTS) OF STRIKES AND 
OTHER INDUSTRIAL ACTION 
 
Through a multitude of measures the Bill aims to restrict the ability of unions and 
workers to take industrial action, especially where it may affect the delivery of 
public services. New balloting thresholds, more detail on ballot papers, longer 
periods of notice, a reduced ballot mandate period and new powers to use agency 
workers as strike-breakers are the chosen methods.   
 
New rules on balloting thresholds 
 
Like earlier Conservative legislation,38 one of the main targets of the Bill are the rules 
on industrial action ballots, compliance with each of which is a  pre-condition of 
trade union immunity from liability for calling industrial action.39 In addition to the 
existing requirement in s.226(2) of a majority voting in favour of the strike, Clause 2 
adds the requirement that at least ‘50% of those who were entitled to vote in the 
ballot did so’: in other words, at least half of the ballot constituency must actually 
vote. Under Clause 3, a further ‘40% support requirement’, is imposed in respect of 
‘important public services’ and ‘ancillary’ services, so that at least 40% of those 
entitled to vote in the ballot must have given their approval.  
 
Future regulations under Clause 3 will specify what falls within such ‘important 
public’ and ‘ancillary’ services listed in Clause 3(2E) as:  
 
(a) health services;  
(b) education of those aged under 17;  
                                                          
38 For discussion see P. Davies and M. Freedland, Labour Legislation and Public Policy (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1993) at ch. 9; S. Fredman, ‘The New Rights: Labour Law and Ideology in the 
Thatcher Years’ (1992) 12 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 24.  
39 See TULRCA, s. 219(4) and s.226. The detailed provisions are outlined in RMT v SERCO; ASLEF v 
London & Birmingham Railway Ltd [2011] ICR 848, paras 15 – 30. 
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(c) fire services;  
(d) transport services;  
(e) decommissioning of nuclear installations and management of radioactive 
waste and spent fuel;  
(f) border security.  
 
The initial list of functions in the Consultation Paper is very wide, and includes local 
and London bus services, all rail operating staff, and Underground workers.40 
Ancillary staff are said to include ‘managers, administrators or cleaners: any role 
that supports others to deliver important public services’ whose absence would have 
an adverse impact on the delivery of the service.41  In both cases the detail of the 
particular roles and functions will be in future secondary legislation which has not 
yet been published in draft form, with the risk that the time for proper debate on this 
critical issue is short. 
 
That these balloting requirements are placed foremost in the legislation is 
unsurprising, since these two provisions are likely to have a serious impact on 
industrial action. Ralph Darlington and John Dobson have observed that, on 
information gathered in respect of turnouts for past industrial action between 2002 
and 2014, only 85 out of 158 strike ballots would have met the 50% threshold, and 
that it is much more difficult to secure the threshold in larger strikes reaching across 
a sector. Of the 158 strike ballots analysed, only 440,000 workers achieved a turnout 
rate over 50%, while 3.3 million workers would have been debarred from taking 
lawful action.42 The effect of the 40% threshold in important public services, 
however, ‘would have very little further effect’ (their emphasis),43 particularly in fire 
service and transport (where the FBU and the RMT tend to obtain large turn outs 
                                                          
40 BIS/15/418 at 10-11.  
41 Ibid., paras 19-20. 
42 R. Darlington and J. Dobson, The Conservative Government’s Proposed Strike Ballot Thresholds: The 
Challenge to Trade Unions (Liverpool: Institute of Employment Rights, 2015) at 24-28. 
43 Ibid., at 31. 
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and overwhelming majorities).44 Despite this potentially serious impact, the 
Consultation Paper and the Impact Assessment focus exclusively on the 40% support 
threshold and ignore the 50% turnout threshold.45  The result is that the Government 
has completely ignored the practical difficulties unions face in contacting its 
members by post in some industries, especially those with a fragmented workforce.46 
 
The Consultation on Ballot Thresholds in Important Public Services gives three 
justifications for the thresholds: that disruptive action on the basis of low ballot 
turnouts is ‘undemocratic’ (the first and last mention of ‘democracy’);47 ‘to ensure 
that industrial action is only used as a measure of last resort’;48 and the far-reaching 
effects of strikes in public services. No evidence is offered to explain which unions or 
workers use strikes other than as a weapon of last resort. Postal ballots are already 
very expensive, and the risks to the workforce and their union of strike action are 
significant (such as deductions from wages, risk of dismissal, and very costly interim 
injunction applications). Unexplained is why more stringent voting requirements 
should apply to unions than in fact are obtained in national or even European 
democratic elections in which turnouts are notoriously low.49 The third justification 
only relates to action taken in ‘important public services’, with important slippage 
                                                          
44 Ibid., at 29-30. 
45 BIS/15/418; BIS/15/418 IA. 
46 See, for example, Balfour Beatty v Unite [2012] ICR 822, where Eady J listed the extensive steps taken 
by Unite to contact its members (para. 31) and accepted the impossibility of determining whether they 
had been successful (para. 41). 
47 See para. 3 - though curiously the term reappears in BIS/15/416, para. 18. 
48 BIS/15/418 at para. 1.  
49 Ibid., paras 2 and 3. See Darlington and Dobson n.42 above at 11 who note that turnout for the 
European Parliament elections in 2014 was just over 34.2%; in the 2012 London Mayoral election it 
was 38.1%; and for the May 2015 general election only 37% of voters and less than 25% of the eligible 
electorate supported the elected Conservative party. 
12 
 
from the language of ‘essential public services’ in the Queen’s speech.50 It cannot 
apply to the 50% threshold.   
 
Special provision for ‘important public services’ or essential services 
 
There is no precedent for the term ‘important public services’ in either international 
or UK law. The measures proposed do not accord with the UK’s treaty obligations 
under the ILO Constitution or Conventions (to which the UK is a party) and are 
inconsistent with the established ILO jurisprudence regarding treatment of ‘essential 
services’. The ILO Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) has long held that: 
‘The right to strike is one of the essential means through which workers and their 
organizations may promote and defend their economic and social interests.’51 
Consequently, the right may only be restricted where the impact of strike action is so 
extreme that special measures need be taken. The CFA has found that this should 
only be the case in respect of: 
- An acute national emergency;52 
- ‘Essential services’ whose interruption would endanger the life, personal safety 
or health of the whole or part of the population;53 and/or 
- ‘Public servants exercising authority in the name of the State’.54 
 
It is clear that some workers in the fire, health, border and nuclear decommissioning 
services might have the capacity to endanger the life, personal safety or health of 
others, and that their access to industrial action can be restricted accordingly.55 But if 
                                                          
50 The Queen’s Speech (May 2015) referred to protection of ‘essential public services against strikes’. 
See https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/queens-speech-2015. We are indebted to Ruth 
Dukes for highlighting this discrepancy.  
51 ILO Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) Digest of Decisions, 5th ed., (Geneva: ILO, 2006), 
para. 522. 
52 Ibid., paras 570-1. 
53 Ibid., para. 585. 
54 Ibid., paras 578-9. 
55 Ibid., paras 578 – 585. See too the existing offence in TULRCA s.240. 
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the aim is to prevent such serious harm, it is unclear that this should be done 
through restrictive balloting requirements (such as the 40% support threshold). In 
some core ‘essential’ services, such as fire, the threshold is likely to be met; in other, 
less essential ones, it may not be. Instead, a minimum service, which as the 
Consultation Paper notes56 is already utilised in the event of action in the fire service, 
makes more sense in ensuring that the public service continues to be delivered, and 
is a mechanism endorsed by the ILO. This is also a method endorsed in such extreme 
cases by the ECSR.57 
 
Education is not regarded as an ‘essential service’ by the ILO CFA because 
temporary interruption of schooling does not endanger ‘life, personal safety or 
health’.58 Teachers retain the right to strike without interference, despite some 
inconvenience and financial burdens for parents (and their employers). Nor, more 
generally, does the broader economic impact of industrial action render a service 
‘essential’.59 The CFA states clearly that: ‘The possible long-term consequences of 
strikes in the teaching sector do not justify their prohibition.’60 Similarly, transport is 
not usually regarded as an ‘essential service’ for, although ‘it is recognized that a 
stoppage in services or undertakings such as transport companies, railways… [etc] 
might disturb the normal life of the community, it can hardly be admitted that the 
stoppage of such services could cause an acute national emergency.’61 The key 
exception would be air traffic control, in respect of which a minimum service or 
‘compensatory guarantee’ of compulsory arbitration could be appropriate.62 The 
Bill’s treatment of schools and general transport as ‘important public services’ may 
therefore infringe Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), 
                                                          
56 BIS/15/418, at 6. 
57 Digest of the Case Law of The European Committee of Social Rights (2008) at 56. 
58 ILO CFA Digest, n.51, para. 589 
59 Ibid., paras 592-3. 
60 Ibid., para. 590. 
61 Ibid., para. 637. 
62 Ibid., paras 585 - 586.  
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as a disproportionate constraint on the right to strike in these sectors.63 There may 
also be an infringement of the Article 11 rights of ‘ancillary’ workers whose role may 
not be critical to delivery of the public service.64  
 
The Government proposes that when a majority of workers in the ballot 
constituency are subject to a 40% threshold the entire ballot should be subjected to 
that threshold (as well as to the 50% turn out requirement).65 The Consultation Paper 
acknowledges that this may be ‘administratively difficult’ for unions to calculate, but 
provides no compensating measures.66 A union’s records of job categories may not 
be up-to-date, and its records of its members’ jobs may not correspond exactly to the 
functions and roles (and ancillary functions) to be listed in the forthcoming 
regulations.67 If it holds separate workplace ballots in a strike,68 it will need to try 
and perform this calculation for each workplace;69 if the ballot is an aggregate one 
held under s.228A of TULRCA the union must perform the calculation across many 
workplaces and for what may be hundreds of different categories. The real effect of 
this proposal (without cooperation from an employer and without e-balloting or 
secure workplace ballots) is to make it prohibitively difficult to call large-scale 
strikes across the public sector, because it potentially extends the reach of the 40% 
                                                          
63 Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen v Turkey.Appn No 68959/01, 21 April 2009; Demir v Turkey at n.25 above (and see 
discussion by K. D. Ewing and J. Hendy, ’The Dramatic Implications of Demir and Baykara’ (2010) 39 
ILJ 2). More recently for a finding of a disproportionate restriction, see Hrvatski Lijecnicki Sindikat v 
Croatia, Appln No. 36701/09, 27 November 2014. The Canadian Supreme Court has recently found 
that governments should not have discretion as to whether staff are designated ‘essential workers’ in 
ways which unfairly deny them the right to strike protected under the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms: Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v Saskatchewan 2015 SCC4. 
64 BIS/15/418, paras. 19-21 at 11-12. 
65 Ibid., paras. 27 – 28.  
66 Ibid., para. 28. 
67 See by analogy Westminster City Council v UNISON [2001] ICR 1046: sufficient to identify workers as 
assessment and advice workers for purpose of “categories” in s.226A. 
68 TULRCA, s.228. 
69 TULRCA s.226(3). 
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threshold far beyond the ‘important public services’ used to justify its imposition. 
Unions may be forced to hold the ballot in accordance with the 40% threshold rule, 
knowing that if they do not do so it may be impracticable for them to demonstrate 
that more than half the workers in the ballot constituency were not in what the 
government defines as ‘important public services’. That this problem may lead to 
injunction applications is envisaged by the Consultation, but is not a cause for 
concern.70 
 
Breach of ILO, ESC and ECHR standards in respect of ballot turnout and support thresholds 
 
The ILO CFA has determined that pre-strike ballots are permissible in certain 
circumstances but only if they are ‘reasonable’ and do not place a ‘substantial 
limitation’ on the means of action open to trade unions.71 These principles were 
applied in Case 2698 (Australia). In Australia, as in the UK, protected industrial 
action is dependent on a ballot being held. Section 451(9) of the Australian Fair Work 
Act 2009 (like proposed Clause 2 of the UK Bill) requires at least 50% of the 
employees on the roll of voters for the ballot to vote in the ballot. The CFA found 
this requirement alone to be ‘excessive’ and likely to hinder the right to strike 
particularly for large enterprises; which chimes with Darlington and Dobson’s 
findings as to strikes in the UK.72   
 
This CFA decision (and others like it)73 is not wholly determinative of whether there 
is a breach of the ESC or Article 11 of the ECHR, but should be highly influential. 
Certainly, the ECSR has expressed considerable concern already regarding the 
‘excessive’ and disproportionate ballot and notice requirements already in place 
                                                          
70 BIS/15/418, para. 28. 
71 B. Gernigon, A. Odero and H. Guido, ILO Principles Concerning the Right to Strike (Geneva, 2000), 25. 
72 See n.42 above. 
73 See also Case No. 2896 (El Salvador) discussed in A. Bogg, ‘Case No. 2896 El Salvador CFA 
Complaint’ (2015) 1 International Labor Rights Case-Law, forthcoming.  
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under TULRCA.74 In interpreting Article 11, the Grand Chamber of the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has said that it ‘can and must take into account 
elements of international law other than the Convention’ as well as ‘the 
interpretation of such elements by competent organs’.75 It is on this basis the ECtHR 
has interpreted Article 11 in the light of ILO (and ESC) jurisprudence.76 The margin 
of appreciation for Contracting States is wide when a measure is ‘not the core but a 
secondary or accessory aspect of trade union activity’, so that the negative 
assessments of the ILO monitoring bodies and the ECSR of the UK’s ban on 
secondary action were not ‘of such persuasive weight’ to lead to a breach of Article 
11 on the particular facts of RMT v United Kingdom. 77 But the 50% ballot thresholds 
affect all strikes and the 40% applies to a very wide range of public sector strikes. 
Their effect is not restricted to a ‘secondary aspect’ of Article 11 but extends to 
preventing the primary action which the ECtHR in RMT saw as part of the ‘very 
substance’ of trade union freedom in Article 11. 78  
 
While we are entering uncharted territory, several factors point to the potential  
incompatibility of the ballot thresholds with Article 11(2): their inconsistency with 
                                                          
74 Jan 2015 Conclusions of the European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR) XX-3 (2014) at 22. 
75 Demir and Baykara n.25 above at para. 85, a case relating to treatment of workers in ‘public’ services. 
For discussion see V. Mantouvalou, ‘Labour Rights in the European Convention on Human Rights: 
An Intellectual Justification for an Integrated Approach to Interpretation’ (2013) 13 Human Rights Law 
Review 529; and K. Lörcher, ‘The New Social Dimension in the Jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR): The Demir and Baykara Judgment, its Methodology and Follow-up’ in F. 
Dorssemont, K. Lörcher and I. Schömann (eds), The European Convention in Human Rights and the 
Employment Relation (Oxford: Hart, 2013) at 6-10 and 16 – 18.  
76 Ibid., especially at paras 101-2, and 122.  
77 The National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers (RMT) v the UK Appn 31045/10, 8.04.14 
[2014] IRLR 467 paras 87-99. See too A. Bogg and K.D. Ewing, ‘The Implications of the RMT Case’ 
(2014) 43(3) ILJ 221 and criticism of the Court’s judgment subsequently in the ‘Concurring Opinion’ of 
Judge Pinto de Albuquerque in the Croatia case n.64 above at para 8 and footnote 34, where notably 
breach of Article 11 was found regardless of the margin of appreciation applicable in cases relating to 
a right to strike. 
78 RMT v the UK n.77 above, para. 98. 
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the ILO (and ESC) decisions; the high levels of the thresholds compared with other 
elections; the de facto serious effects of 50% turnout threshold (let alone the 40% 
support threshold) on the taking of primary action, striking at the very substance of 
Article 11; the findings of the RPC which call into question whether there is 
sufficient evidence to justify the amendments; the extension of the 40% threshold to 
any strike in which a majority of the workers are in important public services (and 
the administrative difficulties of calculating when it applies); the weak correlation 
between the aims of avoiding disruption to the public and the 40% threshold; and, 
last, the decision of the Government not to allow strike ballots to be held in ways 
which would generate broader participation than voting by post. The last factor 
shows clearly why, on a proportionality test, the same aims could be met in a less 
restrictive manner; we turn to it next.   
 
A lack of opportunity for e-ballots and workplace ballots 
 
While Australia was held to breach ILO standards by utilising a 50% turnout 
requirement, at least that country took active steps to respond to technological 
developments, enabling online balloting. In particular, where trade unions are 
willing to pay the costs of balloting themselves, they may secure participation of 
their members by this means.79 The refusal to allow electronic balloting has been the 
subject of concern by the TUC, with Frances O’Grady asking for legislative support 
for such ballots in relation to industrial action.80 Unison’s response to the 
consultation notes that, while the Government has indicated that trade union action 
                                                          
79 See sections 450 and 455 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Australia) which contemplate electronic 
balloting, although by trade unions independently and not under the ballots held by the Australian 
Electoral Commission. We are grateful to Shae McCrystal for carefully explaining to us the dynamics 
of this process; see also http://employment.gov.au/fair-work-act-review.  
80 See Frances O’Grady, Trades Union Congress (TUC) General Secretary, on electronic balloting at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-29072893; also 
http://webrootsdemocracy.org/2015/03/03/report-online-voting-could-boost-turnout-by-9-
million/. 
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has been ‘undemocratic’, there are no proposals to enable secure electronic and 
online workplace balloting, which ‘runs counter to the government’s pursuit of 
electronic participation in every other area of its work’.81 Unite’s submission is 
similar, noting that: ‘Postal voting is out dated, in particular as the only option for 
voting... This Government needs to allow secured workplace ballots and e- ballots, 
alongside postal ballots.’82 Regulations could be adopted under existing powers of 
the Secretary of State to make an order setting out the ‘permissible means’ of 
balloting in addition to postal ballots,83 subject only to the requirement that: ‘(a) 
those entitled to vote have an opportunity to do so; (b) votes cast are secret; and (c) 
the risk of any unfairness or malpractice is minimised.’84  
 
The failure to exercise this power is in tension with the apparent enthusiasm of the 
Consultation Paper for democracy. So much was noted by Caroline Lucas (Green 
MP) on the second reading of the Bill: ‘If it is really about democracy and opening 
things up, why is he not lifting the ban on unions balloting online and in the 
workplace, which would be precisely the way to make a modern democracy 
work?’85 The response of the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills 
and President of the Board of Trade, Sajid Javid, was that such balloting could lead 
(in albeit unspecified ways) to fraud, and he had no answer to the more general call 
for workplace ballots conducted by an independent scrutineer.86 We await a fuller 
exploration of this issue as the Bill receives better scrutiny at later stages. 
 
Other ballot, notice and mandate measures 
                                                          
81 Unison submission n.14 above, at 4.  
82 Unite response to BIS consultation: Ballot thresholds in important public services, 9 September 2015, at 1. 
Available at: https://www.politicshome.com/organisation/page/unite/unite-responses-
consultations. 
83 Employment Relations Act 2004, s. 54.  
84 Ibid.  
85 HC Hansard, 14.09.15, col. 761. 
86 HC Hansard, 14.09.15, col. 767. 
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Various other measures are proposed in clauses 4-8 of the Bill, which have not been  
subject to consultation, despite their potentially significant effects. By clause 5, 
following introduction of the new ballot turnout and support requirements in 
Clauses 2 and 3, the information to members and the employer under ss 231-231A of 
TULRCA about the result of the ballot must include information regarding these 
thresholds. Clause 6 requires that details of industrial action are to be included in the 
union’s annual return to the CO, including details of each ballot result. The 
suspicion is that this requirement is a further step transforming the CO into a person 
increasingly concerned to investigate unions, their membership records and their 
balloting practices87 – a function which sits uneasily with the CO’s quasi-judicial role 
of adjudicating on intra-union disputes.  
 
A further troubling proposal for reform is the new ‘information to be included on 
voting paper’ in Clause 4, adding to the already detailed information which must be 
provided in a ballot paper by virtue of s.229 to include: 
- ‘a reasonably detailed indication of the matter or matters in issue in the trade 
dispute to which the proposed industrial action relates’ 
- If there is a question relating to action short of a strike ‘the type or types of 
industrial action must be specified (either in the question itself or elsewhere on 
the balloting paper)’; and  
- ‘the balloting paper must indicate the period or periods within which the 
industrial action or, as the case may be, each type of industrial action is 
expected to take place’.  
 
The first of these requirements, specification of the precise nature of the trade 
dispute, potentially opens up the action to scrutiny under the current ‘golden 
formula’ set out in TULRCA.88 Any hint that the dispute is in any way ‘political’, 
                                                          
87 See n.10 above.  
88 TULRCA, s. 244. 
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‘secondary’, or connected to terms and conditions of future employees could bring a 
claim for injunctive relief by an employer.89 In addition, employers will probably 
argue that the description of the dispute is insufficiently detailed, does not in fact 
capture all the issues in dispute, or includes matters which at the time of the ballot 
were no longer in dispute. As was observed in the second reading debate, ‘if a 
failure to provide such information is to be a basis for legal action by employers 
against workers taking industrial action, it is crucial that the House should be 
informed in advance of how “reasonably detailed” is to be defined’.90  
 
Clause 7 requires that two weeks’ notice is to be given of industrial action, double 
the seven days applicable at the present time. In Australia, by way of comparison, 
three working days’ notice is required or such longer period of notice as specified in 
the protected industrial action ballot order. The notice period may be extended only 
in ‘exceptional circumstances’ up to seven working days.91 By any comparative 
standards, the UK period of notice already seems harsh, especially when combined 
with the newfound ability of an employer to hire agency workers to avoid the action 
having any effect.92 Moreover, Unison raise the more practical objection that a 14-
day notice period ‘will also significantly raise the risk and likelihood of victimisation 
of trade union members, placing them under great pressure with implications for 
their well-being, damage to industrial relations and further potential litigation’.93  
 
                                                          
89 See TULRCA ss 244, 244 and, for example, Mercury Communications Ltd v Scott-Garner [1983] IRLR 
494 and University College London Hospital NHS Trust v Unison [1999] IRLR 31. Note the concerns 
expressed regarding the too ready availability of injunctive relief in the Direct Request of ILO-CEACR 
concerning the UK (2012 – Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise 
Convention, (No. 87)) also referred to in Jan 2015 Conclusions of the European Committee of Social 
Rights (ECSR) XX-3 (2014) at 22; in respect of which SERCO n.39 offered some guidance but has not 
alleviated the problem. 
90 HC Hansard, 14.09.15, col. 812 per Alex Cunningham (Labour). 
91 Fair Work Act 2009 (Australia), s.414(2).   
92 See n.11. 
93 Unison submission n.14 above, at 5. 
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A new provision in Clause 8 will lead to expiry of mandate for industrial action four 
months after the date of the ballot. At present TULRCA provides that industrial 
action which has the support of a ballot has no time limit if initial action is taken four 
weeks from the date of the ballot (or up to eight weeks if the parties so agree, giving 
time for negotiation).94 This new provision enables the employer to stall, delay or 
prolong negotiations, knowing that if the four-month deadline passes the union will 
face the expense and inconvenience of a further ballot if it wishes to retain the ability 
to take industrial action, even though the same dispute continues. This provision, as 
the TUC has noted, in concerns expressed to the ILO Committee of Experts on the 
Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR), ‘introduces a new 
layer of procedural burden on unions (fresh notices … and so on) and it adds 
significantly to the costs of a trade union in a system in which the ballot would again 
have to be a fully postal ballot at the union’s expense. This is not a case of refreshing 
a mandate so much as a case of disrupting by administrative burdens lawful and 
legitimate action.’95 
 
Use of agency workers as replacement labour 
 
Regulation 7 of the Conduct of Employment Agencies and Employment Business 
Regulations 200396 (the ‘Conduct Regulations’), made under s. 5 of the Employment 
Agencies Act 1973, prohibits an employment business97 from providing an agency 
worker98 to perform the duties normally performed by a worker taking part in a strike 
or other industrial action. A failure to comply with this regulation is an offence and is 
                                                          
94 TULRCA, s. 234. 
95 See https://www.tuc.org.uk/union-issues/trade-union-bill/trade-union-bill-tuc-submission-ilo-
committee-experts. Note prepared for the TUC by Professor Keith Ewing, August 2015. 
96 SI 2003/3319. 
97 Defined in s.13(3) of the Employment Agencies Act 1973: see the Conduct Regulations n. 97 above, 
Reg. 2. 
98 Named a ‘work-seeker’ but in an agency worker in everyday language: Conduct Regulations n.97 
above, Reg. 2. 
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actionable insofar as it causes damage. 99  Such provisions are common in other 
European countries, such as France and Spain, and apply in the UK to workers 
employed by gangmasters.100 They protect both the right to strike and the workers, 
who may be in a precarious category, who are used to replace the strikers. In its 
manifesto the Conservative party said it would repeal this ‘nonsensical’ restriction.101 
The short Consultation Paper devoted to agency work claimed that repealing 
Regulation 7 will help employers to limit the impact of strike action, but giving only 
examples of strikes which affect the public.102  
 
The ILO expert bodies have said that requisitioning of workers to cover legal strikes 
should be limited to cases involving public services, essential services ‘in the strict 
sense of the term’ and cases of acute national or local crisis.103 This type of practice, 
according to the CEACR, can seriously impair the right to strike.104 The compatibility 
of the proposed repeal of Regulation 7 with ILO Conventions to which the UK is a 
signatory, and which are relevant to Article 11, is once again ignored in the 
Consultation and in the ECHR Memorandum accompanying the Bill. 105  What the 
Consultation does mention is the Government’s commitment ‘to ensuring that strikes 
only ever happen as the result of a clear, democratic decision’,106 as reflected in the 
                                                          
99 See s.5 of the 1973 Act and Conduct Regulations n.97 above, Reg. 30. 
100 L1242-6 of the French Labour Code; and Article 8 of the Law 14/1994 on Temporary Work 
Agencies Regulation (Spain); see also Gangmasters (Licensing Conditions) Rules 2009, SI 2009 No.307, 
Reg. 10. 
101 Conservative Party Manifesto (2015), 19. 
102 BIS/15/416, at para. 18. 
103 See the report of the ILO CEACR, General Survey on the Fundamental Conventions Concerning Rights 
at Work in Light of the ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalisation, 2008 (Report III (Part 1B)) 
International Labour Conference, 101st Session, 2012, at para. 151. 
104 See Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining: General Survey on the Reports on the Freedom of 
Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention etc, (Report III (Part 4B)), International 
Labour Conference, 81st Session, 1994, at para. 175. 
105 See n.18 above. 
106 BIS/15/416, para. 18. 
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new ballot thresholds. Even where a strike has democratic legitimacy, however, the 
government still wants to increase employers’ powers to resist it, by allowing the 
replacement of strikers by agency workers in all businesses, and not simply the public 
services referred to in the Consultation.  
 
3. PICKETING AND PROTEST 
 
In its manifesto, the Conservative party said that it would ‘tackle intimidation of non-
striking workers’.107 The relevant Consultation Paper set out two sets of proposals for 
‘modernising’ the rules relating to picketing and protests. The first, by Clause 9 of the 
Bill, adds a new s.220A to TULRCA, so that picketing organised or encouraged by a 
trade union, will not benefit from the lawfulness shield for peaceful picketing in s.220 
unless the union appoints a ‘picket supervisor’ and meets further conditions as to that 
person’s qualifications and duties. The second set of proposals goes beyond the 
manifesto commitment but seems based on untested evidence to the Carr Review of 
what the government describes as ‘unacceptable’ conduct in new forms of protest 
which take place away from the workplace, usually called ‘leverage’ action.108 These 
latter proposals are wide-ranging but have not (yet) led to the drafting of any clauses 
in the Bill.  
 
New restrictions on lawful picketing 
 
TULRCA s.220(1) currently makes it ‘lawful’ for a person (i) in contemplation or 
furtherance of a trade dispute (ii) to attend at or near his own place of work for the 
purpose of ‘peacefully obtaining or communicating information, or peacefully 
persuading any person to work or abstain from working’. Other provisions allow a 
                                                          
107 Conservative Party Manifesto (2015), 19. 
108 BIS/15/415, 4-5 refers to evidence from the Association of Chief Police Officers. Other evidence to 
the Carr Review was more circumspect: see the House of Commons Briefing Paper, Trade Union Bill 
(7.09.15), by Doug Pyper, at 45. 
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trade union official to attend such a picket if the official is accompanying a member109 
and permit workers dismissed in connection with a trade dispute to attend at their 
former workplace.110  
 
The narrow interpretations the judiciary gave to earlier incarnations of s.220 are well-
known111 and the width of the section was significantly reduced by the Employment 
Act 1980, restricting protection to a worker attending ‘at or near his own place of 
work’.112 But even after being shrunk by Parliament and wrung by the judiciary, the 
section remains important because, first, it circumscribes a reasonably clear sphere of 
‘lawful’ action which protects both the individual pickets and the trade union. It 
protects, for example, peaceful picketing which occurs after a union has repudiated 
industrial action. Second, its concept of deemed lawfulness provides, to a degree, a 
mobile shield against the judicial creation of new torts.113 Third, it is a useful location 
for arguments that ‘lawful’ in s.220 should be read in order to ensure that picketing 
which would be protected by Articles 10 and 11 ECHR is immunised against domestic 
legal challenges.114 Fourth, it offers the unique substantive protection to the intricate 
prohibition of secondary action in s.224 of TULRCA.115 It does not, of course, permit 
workers in dispute with employer A to picket the premises of employer B;116 but it 
may permit workers of A, while assembling outside their own place of work, to induce 
other workers, not employed by A, not to attend work. Such action would, but for the 
                                                          
109 See TULRCA, s.220(1)(b). 
110 See TULRCA, s.220(3). As derived from the Molestation of Workmen Act of 1859, and s.2 of the 
Trade Disputes Act 1906. 
111 See, especially, Broome v DPP [1974] AC 587, and Thomas v NUM [1985] ICR 887.  
112 See where an employer shut its premises and transferred work to a new site: News Group v SOGAT 
No.2 [1987] ICR 187. 
113 Picketing is expressly not exempted from tort liability in a trade dispute unless it is lawful under 
TULRCA, s.220: see TULRCA, s.219(3). 
114 Arguments based on Article 11 have taken increased prominence in cases such as Gate Gourmet v 
TGWU [2005] IRLR 881 and ISS Mediclean v GMB [2015] IRLR 96. 
115 TULRCA, s.224(1). 
116 In that case the picketing would not be at their own place of work. 
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exception for lawful picketing in s.224(1), amount to unlawful secondary action under 
s.224(2).117 In the RMT case, the UK government emphasised the importance of s.220 
in support of its arguments that the law of the UK on secondary action did not unduly 
infringe the right to strike.118 
 
The Bill now seeks to introduce a proposed new s.220A, which will remove the 
protection of s.220 from ‘any picketing which a trade union organises or encourages 
its members to take part in’ unless it meets seven conditions. ‘Picketing’ remains 
defined in terms of attendance ‘at or near a place of work’ in contemplation or 
furtherance of a trade dispute and for the purposes listed in s.220. Other forms of 
picketing are untouched: the provision is unique to union-organised or encouraged 
peaceful picketing. 
 
The seven conditions which such picketing must meet to benefit from the protective 
shield of s.220 are the following. First, the union must appoint a person to ‘supervise 
the picketing’.119 Second, the person must be a union official or person who is ‘familiar’ 
with the Code of Practice on picketing.120 Third, the union or supervisor must take 
reasonable steps to tell the police the supervisor’s name, the picket location and how 
to contact the supervisor.121 Fourth, the supervisor must have a letter of authorisation 
from the union.122 The fifth, remarkable, condition requires the supervisor to show the 
letter not just to any constable but also to ‘any other person who reasonably asks to 
see it’.123 Sixth, the supervisor is plainly a dedicated person, for he or she must be 
present at the picket at all times or be ‘readily contactable’ by the union or the police 
                                                          
117 That is, because any inducement of breach of contract would relate to the contracts of employment 
of those who were not employed by A, the party to the dispute. 
118 See n.77 above, at paras 36 and 60. 
119 See the proposed s.220A(2). 
120 S.220A(3). 
121 S.220A(4). 
122 S.220A(5). 
123 S.220A(6). 
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and able to attend at short notice.124 And, seventh, the supervisor must wear a badge 
or other armband identifying his or her status.125 If the union cannot comply with the 
provisions it is not only it which will lose the benefit of the protective shield of s.220; 
so will the individual pickets.  
 
The origin of these provisions is the Code of Practice on Picketing 126  which, the 
Consultation Paper cheerily notes, unions mostly observe already, so that the 
requirements will have ‘little impact on responsible picketing’ but will encourage 
more responsible picketing among the unregenerate.127 Yet the claim that most unions 
already appoint a duly qualified picket supervisor in accordance with the seven 
conditions in s.220A at every picket line has no empirical basis.128 At the very least it 
is questionable; at most it is cynical. Take a strike on the London Underground, the 
railways, at a nationwide chain-store or at schools - each ticket office, each station, 
each shop, each school (and many more locations besides) is a workplace, at which 
workers are entitled to attend for lawful picketing. Where strikes in such industries 
are organised or encouraged by a union, it will need to train and find duly qualified 
supervisors who are willing to be attend what may be hundreds of sites (or try to 
restrict its members’ right to picket at their workplaces). Data from recent strikes 
confirm this.129 
 
No union could meet such a need by full-time officials: it will have to try and rely on 
volunteers. Yet these volunteers must be trained and qualified. They must be prepared 
to advertise their trade union membership to their employer and the world by their 
                                                          
124 S.220A(7). 
125 S.220A(8). 
126 See BIS/15/415, 8-9. The Code (1992) was introduced under s.3 of the Employment Act 1982, now 
TULRCA s.203. 
127 BIS/15/415, para. 18, at 9. 
128 Though an Impact Assessment was published on proposals to require unions to publish plans of 
industrial action (see below), none has been issued for the changes in picket supervision. 
129 An RMT strike in the railways in May 2015 listed 1,127 workplaces in the ballot notice and a strike 
in the London Underground in 2013 listed 454. Source: Thompsons Solicitors. 
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badge or armband, and to have their name and contact details given to the police. 
Trade union membership is an aspect of private life and consequently is ‘sensitive 
personal data’ under section 2 of the Data Protection Act 1998 as well as being 
protected under the Employment Act 1999 (Blacklisting) Regulations 2010. There are 
often good reasons for an individual keeping it secret from employers and the police, 
illustrated by the blacklisting scandal in the construction industry currently pending 
before the courts. Liberty has drawn attention to this potential infringement of the 
civil liberties, but it has been ignored.130 This background threat will, of course, only 
add to the difficulty of recruiting volunteers. 
 
Finding supervisors is not the only problem. For example, to trigger the duty it is 
probably sufficient that a union organises or encourages the picketing in general, 
based on common law agency principles where officials are involved,131 rather than 
organising the particular picket line in question. Once the section is engaged, however, 
the union must take reasonable steps to inform the police ‘where’ each picket will take 
place - something of which it may have little knowledge.132 In addition, the supervisor 
must show the appointment letter to anyone who ‘reasonably asks to see it’,133 a 
provision which is likely to exacerbate conflict on any picket line where requests are 
made by the employer or, for example, security guards engaged by it.. 
 
A breach of any one of the seven conditions,134 likely to be a fresh source of forensic 
disputes in injunctions, will result in the loss of the shield against the employer, even 
                                                          
130 See n.19 above and cf. the BIS/15/466, at 7, which blandly states that the measures are ‘wholly 
proportionate’.   
131 See Heatons Transport v TGWU [1972] ICR 308.  
132 The duty is to take ‘reasonable steps’ to inform the police; but there is no qualification of 
reasonable practicability as to the information which must be provided (cf. ss. 226A(2D) and 
s.234A(3D) on pre-ballot notices and notices of industrial action). 
133 See proposed s.22A(6). 
134 There is no equivalent for ‘small accidental failures’ cf. TULRCA, s.232B. Nor are the duties 
apparently based on what is reasonably practicable or the reasonable belief of the union (cf. s.226A(1) 
and s.227, on pre-ballot notices and balloting). 
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if it suffers no prejudice as a result,135 and give rise to other, potentially very serious 
legal consequences. If the Bill’s provisions are enacted, a peaceful picket of six 
members, not accompanied by a picket supervisor, will engage in unlawful secondary 
action if they induce other workers employed by a third party not to cross the picket 
line. The tort of inducement of breach of contract can be committed by the ‘presence 
alone’ of pickets, even without active persuasion.136 The union will probably be liable 
for this tort on the basis it ‘encouraged’ the picketing even if it had no knowledge of 
the particular picket or no practical ability to appoint a qualified supervisor there. The 
individual pickets will lose the protective shield of s.220 even though they had no 
power to appoint a supervisor. So long as the union is held to have ‘induced’ the acts 
of the pickets, the pickets’ industrial action will not be ‘protected industrial action’ 
within the meaning of s.238A, because the union’s action will not be covered by the 
immunity in s.219.137  
 
These consequences for a peaceful picket have nothing to do with the stated aim of 
the Bill, to tackle the kinds of intimidation of non-strikers referred to in the 
consultation, such as threats and assaults. 138  Existing criminal provisions protect 
against intimidation on the picket line, some of which are listed in the Consultation.139 
It is notable that in its submission to the Carr Review, the Association of Chief Police 
Officers (ACPO) said that the current legal framework was generally effective and did 
not ask for more powers, only better guidance for the police.140 The kinds of behaviour 
listed in the Consultation and upon which the Government relies to justify the new 
section would already fall outside s.220, as well as probably amounting to torts such 
as public nuisance.141 The new s.220A targets indiscriminately unions and workers 
                                                          
135 See Metrobus v Unite [2010] ICR 173. 
136 See Union Traffic Ltd v TGWU [1989] IRLR 127 per Bingham LJ at para. 26. 
137 See s.219(3), as amended by the Bill at clause 9, and s.224. 
138 BIS/15/415, para. 1. 
139 BIS/15/415, 6-7. See especially TULRCA, s.241. 
140 See Carr Review, n.29 above, at 92-94. 
141 See SOGAT No.2, n.112, above. 
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who picket peacefully, as well as those who do not. No other membership 
organisation which encourages a peaceful demonstration is required to police it as 
well  or face potentially serious civil sanctions if it fails to do so (even when it is not 
possible or practicable for it to do so). These effects betray the Bill’s true purpose: to 
penalise union-organised industrial action tout court. 
 
The right to picketing is an aspect of freedom of assembly in Article 11 ECHR, which 
is one of the foundations of a democratic society, so that only ‘convincing and 
compelling reasons’ can justify any interference with it, including administrative rules 
on giving notices and the like.142 The glib answer to the proportionality question in 
the ECHR Memorandum is that the new supervisor requirements are ‘wholly 
proportionate and already reflect current practice’.143 An adverb is often a sign of a 
weak contention, and this one is no exception: current practice is not to have a duly 
qualified picket supervisor with a letter of authorisation at every workplace where a 
picket may occur, whose name is provided to the police in advance, and who shows 
the letter to the police and any busybody when asked. In the absence of that 
assumption, no convincing or compelling reasons for the new section are made out. 
 
The Bill’s provisions also bring into sharp focus the difference in treatment of 
picketing and other forms of peaceful assembly and protest, both of which are 
protected under Article 11. TULRCA seeks to circumscribe “picketing”, expressly 
defined for the first time in the new s.220A(9) by its link to the workers’ place of work, 
but the boundary between a picket and a protest is hazy.144 Huddled around a brazier 
near the workplace in a dispute about wages, the strikers are pickets; if they march 
down the road, they magically transform themselves into protesters. Many workers 
do not normally work from a single premises, something recognised by their right in 
s.220(3) to attend at “any premises of [their] employer from which [they] work” or 
                                                          
142 Kuznetsov v Russia Appn 10877/04, 23.01.09, esp. paras 39-49. 
143 BIS/15/466 at 7. 
144 SOGAT No.2, n.112, above. 
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their work is administered.145 The provisions of new s.220A will further deepen the 
legal division between two categories that dissolve into each other outside the court 
room.146  
 
It is little wonder that, faced with the potential legal labyrinth of Part V TULRCA, 
unions have increasingly resorted to ‘leverage action’. Adding to those provisions 
only increases the pressure to abandon traditional forms of organised picketing and 
engage in other forms of protest, whose shape and forms are less predictable.147 
 
Restrictions on Protest Generally 
 
While the legal restrictions on traditional industrial action provide an incentive to use 
other forms of protest, the government has no qualms about trying to restrict this too. 
Further proposals in the Consultation Paper on Intimidation seek to regulate protests 
away from the workplace, or ‘leverage’ action. In support of these proposals, the 
Consultation refers to evidence relating to demonstrations, internet usage, protests at 
private residences and third party premises, all submitted by the ACPO to the Carr 
Review.148 But the examples were mostly minor, such as ‘playing loud music, which 
was interrupted by loud speaker announcements’ and displaying an inflatable rat.149 
Probably in recognition of the shaky evidential foundation, the Consultation asked 
responders to provide examples of intimidatory behaviour150 - hardly a signal of fair 
consultation, and a move criticised by the RPC.151 
 
                                                          
145 See s.220(3). 
146 This problem was raised in the ACPO submission to the Carr Review: see n.29 above at 103. 
147 L. McLuskey, ‘Can Unions Stay Within the Law Any Longer?’ (2015) 44(3) ILJ 439.  
148 BIS/15/415, 4-5. While the INEOS dispute at Grangemouth is cited as a particular example, it is 
notable that the Carr Review (n.29 above) dealt with this at 26-32, based on evidence from Ineos and 
not Unite. 
149 Carr Review, n.29 above, at 96. 
150 BIS/15/415, 6. 
151 See RPC15-BIS-2404 at n.31 above.  
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Untroubled by a weak evidential basis, the government makes various proposals, 
including a possible new criminal offence of intimidation on the picket line; requiring 
unions to publish details of their pickets and protests to employers, the police and the 
CO, who is to be given an enhanced role in enforcement action; 152  and annual 
reporting on picketing, protests and action taken by employers in response.153 It also 
proposes to up-date the Code of Practice to cover, for example social media and the 
rights of non-striking workers, the public and businesses.154  
 
As the Consultation Paper acknowledges, there already exist a number of civil 
penalties and criminal offences which apply to protests.155 This is not the place to deal 
with the detail of the bewildering array of criminal offences regulating public protest 
in the UK, save to note that a wide range of behaviour is caught and that they often 
overlap.156 Buttressing these offences are various provisions which give police officers 
wide powers to give directions to protestors and others, and to arrest those who fail 
to comply.157 Nor is the civil law silent. So long as workers are not in breach of their 
contracts of employment, the traditional economic torts, such as inducing breach of 
contract, are less easily engaged. For instance, in an early example of ‘leverage’ action, 
TGWU v Middlebroook Mushrooms,158 89 mushroom pickers dismissed for striking over 
a pay cut distributed leaflets outside a supermarket and in other public places, urging 
customers not to buy their ex-employers’ mushrooms. The Court of Appeal held there 
                                                          
152 BIS/15/415, paras 24-29. 
153 Ibid., paras 30-32. 
154 Ibid., paras 33-38. 
155 Ibid., para. 7. See for example the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 which has both criminal 
and civil dimensions.  
156 For example, see: the Public Order Act 1986, especially ss. 4A and 5; s.137 of the Highways Act; 
s.68 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994; and s.241 of TULRCA including an offence of 
watching or besetting ‘the house or other place where a person resides, works, carries on business or 
happens to be’. 
157 These include Public Order Act 1986, s.12; the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.42; and Part 3 
of the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. 
158 [1993] IRLR 232. 
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were no unlawful means for the purpose of an economic tort, making an early 
reference to Article 10. 159  But private nuisance will apply where there is undue 
interference with a person’s enjoyment of his or her property,160 and other torts, such 
as assault, apply to serious intimidation.  
 
Especially since the Human Rights Act 1998 came into force, the courts have been 
engaged in the delicate process of interpreting these criminal offences and civil torts 
in order to ensure due respect for the rights to freedom of expression of assembly in 
Articles 10 and 11 ECHR respectively. This, according to the Consultation Paper, is 
one ‘key problem’: the difficulty of effective enforcement where the police are under 
a duty to ‘facilitate lawful protests’. 161  A linked problem is that civil actions by 
employers can be ‘time-consuming, and potentially expensive and slow’.162 But in fact 
where an employer has a good claim it can obtain an interim injunction forthwith and 
recover its legal costs from the union: the route is no different from traditional strike 
injunctions which employers frequently deploy to good effect to stop strikes. The real 
problem lies elsewhere: that for the most part the courts have subjected injunction 
applications which seek to restrain protests to careful scrutiny, not simply applying 
the ‘balance of convenience’ American Cyanamid test, in order to ensure injunctions do 
not interfere unduly with freedom of protest or expression.163 It is not the adequacy of 
the civil framework which causes the problem: it is the right to freedom of protest. 
 
The Government’s solution to this problem is to impose further burdens on one 
membership organisation alone: trade unions. The proposals are vague at the moment, 
                                                          
159 See per Neill LJ at para. 25. 
160 Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd [1997] AC 655 (cf. the illegitimate extension of the tort to control pickets 
in Thomas v NUM [1985] ICR 886). 
161 BIS/15/415, para. 8. 
162 Ibid. 
163 See Human Rights Act 1998, s.12, Cream Holdings v Banerjee [2005] 1 AC 253 and, for example, 
Norvartis Pharmaceuticals v Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty [2009] EWHC 2716 and Eli Lilly v Stop 
Huntingdon Animal Cruelty [2011] EWHC 3527 at para. 13. 
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and on some there is almost no detail (such as controls on the use of social media). The 
most developed are those which will require a union to give 14 days’ advance notice 
to the employer, the police and the CO of when it is to hold a protest, where it would 
be, how many people will be involved, whether there will be loudspeakers, whether 
social media will be used and so on.164 The genesis seems to have been a suggestion 
made to the Carr Review from two organisations, including a medium-sized firm of 
commercial solicitors.165  
 
Despite the very large questions these proposals pose about civil liberties, police 
powers, their interaction with the existing criminal and civil law, and the detail of 
legislation, in the absence of any draft clauses the time for consultation will be short. 
By the same token, there are serious issues about their compatibility with human 
rights law because the margin of appreciation disappears to almost vanishing point 
where the individual demonstrators are peaceful.166 The ECtHR has held that duties 
to give prior notice of peaceful demonstrations to public authorities are permissible 
for reasons of public order and national security, but they must not be hidden 
obstacles to freedom of peaceful assembly and must allow for spontaneous protests.167 
The existing requirements in TULRCA to give 14 days’ notice of ballots and industrial 
action have been strongly criticised as unduly burdensome by the ILO and ESC expert 
bodies.168 The proposals have at best a weak connection with preserving public order; 
they require notice to employers, not only public bodies; if they are enacted unions 
                                                          
164 BIS/15/415, paras 25-29. Together with a duty on unions to provide details of their industrial 
action in an annual report, these proposals were the focus of the Impact Assessment on Intimidation 
BIS/15/419 IA. 
165 See Carr Report n.29, 103-4. 
166 See Ezelin v France (1991) 14 EHRR 362 at para. 53. 
167 See Aldemir v Turkey Appn 32124/02 and others, 2.06.08 at paras 42-3; and Gün et Autres v Turquie 
Appn No. 8029/07, 18.06.13, at paras 77 and 83 (not available in English). See too the guidelines of the 
OSCE/ODIHR Panel of Experts, Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly (Warsaw/Strasbourg: 
2010), at 63-96, available at http://www.osce.org/baku/105947. 
168 See RMT v United Kingdom, n. 77 above, at paras 28-29 and 35, dealing with s.226A and s.235A 
TULRCA. 
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will be deprived of the right to organise spontaneous demonstrations; the 14-day 
period of notice goes beyond the time needed for the state authorities to prepare;169 
and it is unclear why only protests organised by unions should face such bureaucratic 
obstacles.  
 
The provisions also illustrate the basic unfairness in singling out union-backed 
protests for regulation. Let’s return to a historical example of a leverage protest - 
Middlebrook Mushrooms - and assume the proposals were law. The union (then the 
TGWU) of the 89 dismissed mushroom pickers could not organise any form of protest 
at the time the workers were summarily dismissed, as it tried to do in the case itself. 
It would need to give 14 days’ notice of the planned peaceful protests outside 
supermarkets and in shopping precincts to the employer, the police and the CO, both 
reducing the impact of the protest and giving the employer time to plan its campaign 
or go into hiding. If the plans were not published in time to any of these bodies, the 
CO could issue a declaration, an enforcement order, or even a financial penalty of up 
to £20,000.170 Though this would not be a ‘civil offence’ [sic] in its own right it would 
apparently assist the employer in obtaining an interim injunction.171 No doubt in the 
first place the employer would make an application to the CO, an office in future to 
be funded by employers’ associations and trade unions under other proposals in the 
Bill,172 to obtain what would be in effect a form of cost-free order against the union, 
backed with hefty financial penalties for non-compliance.  
 
If the sacked mushroom pickers were lucky enough to have sufficient service to bring 
claims of unfair dismissal, they would need to pay a substantial fee to bring a tribunal 
                                                          
169 The OSCE/ODIHR Guidelines recommend no more than a few days: see n.167 above, para. 116. In 
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170 See Bill, clause 16, inserting a new s.256D into TULRCA. 
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claim.173 If they won, they would receive compensation capped at one year’s salary 
which they could try to recover in a system for enforcing tribunal awards which has 
been shown to be woefully inadequate.174 The need for collective protest is all the 
greater where the legal regime provides little practical protection for worker protest 
in the form of strike, but the Government nonetheless proposes to restrict this outlet 
too.    
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
In the second reading in Parliament, Sajid Javid stated that the Bill was not a 
‘declaration of war on the trade union movement’ and was not an attempt to ban 
industrial action.175 Instead, it was the latest stage in a ‘long journey of modernisation’ 
which would put power in the hands of the union membership, bring ‘sunlight to the 
dark corners of the movement’, and protect the rights of the public who are affected 
by strikes.176 The detailed procedures in TULRCA Part V, probably still ‘the most 
restrictive union laws in the Western world'177 , already ensure that strikes only take 
place with membership approval in a secret postal ballot, under the bright light of 
independent scrutiny. If the real concern of the Government were greater democracy 
within trade unions, the obvious step would be to allow forms of voting other than 
postal ballots, especially in an era when most post is junk mail, often discarded 
without being read.  
 
Turnout and voting thresholds are blunt tools with which to achieve the third aim, of 
                                                          
173 See for a review of the impact of tribunal fees: D. Pyper and F. McGuiness, Employment Tribunal 
Fees (House of Commons Briefing Paper No.7081, 15 September 2015) and the TUC Report at 
https://www.tuc.org.uk/sites/default/files/TUC_Report_At_what_price_justice.pdf. 
174 BIS, Payment of Tribunal Awards: 2013 Study (2013) BIS/13/1270. 
175 HC Hansard, 14.09.15, col 761. 
176 Ibid. 
177 See Tony Blair’s statement to an interview in the Sun cited again in the Guardian (2001): 
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protecting the ‘rights’ of those affected by strikes. In some essential public services 
both thresholds will usually be met; in other industries where members are hard to 
contact by post or do not return ballot papers, the 50% requirement may operate as a 
bar on taking industrial action, even if there is no significant effect on third parties 
beyond the employer. Even where the thresholds are met, still the Government wants 
to introduce additional restrictions. Relying on inadequate information and 
assumptions, it aims to give employers greater freedom to replace strikers and wants 
to squeeze union-organised peaceful picketing and protest into an ever tighter legal 
straitjacket. The Government backs its proposals with little empirical research and 
skates over issues of compliance with international and European human rights 
standards to which the UK is a signatory. Any disruption to the public or private 
sphere by unions’ collective action is, on this view, unacceptable or is outweighed by 
the interests of third parties; if this is not a war, it is odd that only unions are targeted 
for regulation.  
 
Early in the second reading Javid explained how his father was helped by trade unions 
in the cotton mills and when a ‘whites-only’ policy threatened to prevent him from 
working as a bus driver.178 He drew no connection between this assistance and the 
right to take effective collective action. But without the practical ability to strike or 
protest, the union’s appeals on behalf of his father might well have fallen on deaf ears; 
future generations of exploited workers may be less fortunate, or may be forced to 
take action outside the remit of an unduly restrictive legal regime.  
                                                          
178 See HC Hansard, 14.09.15, col. 760. 
